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Abstract
Distributed systems are hard to reason about largely be-
cause of uncertainty about what may go wrong in a particular
execution, and about whether the system will mitigate those
faults. Tools that perturb executions can help test whether
a system is robust to faults, while tools that observe execu-
tions can help better understand their system-wide effects. We
present Box of Pain, a tracer and fault injector for unmodified
distributed systems that addresses both concerns by interpos-
ing at the system call level and dynamically reconstructing
the partial order of communication events based on causal re-
lationships. Box of Pain’s lightweight approach to tracing and
focus on simulating the effects of partial failures on commu-
nication rather than the failures themselves sets it apart from
other tracing and fault injection systems. We present evidence
of the promise of Box of Pain and its approach to lightweight
observation and perturbation of distributed systems.
1 Introduction
Distributed systems are all around us and yet are riddled with
bugs. This should make us uneasy even if it comes as no
surprise. The space of possible executions of a distributed
system is exponential in the number of communicating pro-
cesses and in the number of messages, making it difficult to
build confidence that distributed programs of even modest
complexity are free from errors. Tools that require painstaking
instrumentation and fine-grained control of runtime systems,
including both bug finding approaches such as software model
checking [12, 17] and debugging approaches such as deter-
ministic replay [4, 9], have made few inroads into distributed
systems software quality methodologies. Instead, the field is
dominated by incomplete approaches based on testing, which
can be effective at finding bugs but cannot rule them out.
In the testing community, there is increasing interest in
light-weight techniques for observing and perturbing execu-
tions during integration tests, such as call graph tracing [22]
and targeted [7] or random [8] fault injection. These tech-
niques make it possible to better cover the space of possible
executions (e.g., by driving the system into rare cases trig-
gered by events like machine crashes and network partitions)
and better understand such events’ system-wide effects. Better
still, they impose only modest overheads, allowing observabil-
ity and resiliency to be built up in a pay-as-you-go fashion.
Unfortunately, these ostensibly lightweight techniques of-
ten require instrumentation at the application layer (e.g., prop-
agating annotations to downstream calls or identifying fault
interposition points), a process that must be repeated for each
application. Existing tracing and fault injection techniques
tend to be coarse-grained, leading to low-fidelity signals (e.g.
call graphs whose nodes represent service endpoints) and
high-overhead experiments (e.g. modeling crash faults by
rebooting servers). Moreover, since tracing and fault injec-
tion have evolved separately, there is often an impedance
mismatch between them. For example, a fine-grained fault
injection system is of little use if the granularity of the tracing
system is too coarse to interpret the effects of the experiments.
Our philosophy on tracing and fault infrastructure is three-
fold. First, a distributed system in which independent nodes
communicate via message passing will manifest any fault 1
as the absence of messages (or explicit error such as timeout).
To understand the effects of these phenomena on the pro-
cesses that witness them, then, a fault injector need only focus
on removing communication edges in an execution graph;
thus, we can make use of a tracing framework that focuses
on reconstructing communication graphs and partial orders.
Second, we believe (and will provide evidence) that although
the space of possible executions of a distributed system is
exponentially large in the number of events, in practice some
executions are significantly more likely than others; thus,
even if an understanding of a system is based on witnessing
schedules of executions, we can bound the number of sched-
ules we are likely to see. Third, tracing and fault-injection
should co-evolve—tracing is necessary to inform and perform
targeted fault-injection, which can only perturb events in a lan-
1We assume the omission failure model and are concerned only with
distributed bugs—i.e., those that could not be discovered using single-site
fault injection tools.
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guage that is defined by the tracing infrastructure itself; thus,
economy of mechanism outweighs separation of concerns.
We are building a tracing and fault injection system, Box of
Pain, which embodies our philosophy. Box of Pain witnesses
a schedule of a distributed system execution by tracing at the
system-call level and uses those system calls to reconstruct the
communication graph of the system. We argue that this inter-
position point is not only effective at faithfully capturing the
communication pattern between threads (which constitutes an
adequate fault surface), but that it also manages the trade-off
between generality, ease of use (as systems need not be in-
strumented manually), and understanding of application-level
semantics. We discuss how Box of Pain is able to effectively
trace and inject faults in a distributed system because, while
the space of possible executions is large, we often need only a
small representation of the whole system to find bugs [14,24],
but also because these possible different execution schedules
will often be consistent with the same partial order, and so
are effectively the “same” execution, moving a theoretically
intractable problem into the practical realm.
2 Background
Unlike traditional model checkers that identify bugs in speci-
fications, software model checkers (SMCs) [12, 17] systemat-
ically explore the state space of actual implementations via
fine-grained control of a program’s execution schedule, and
backtracking as necessary. When a bug is identified in such a
concurrent system, it is often challenging to reproduce when
debugging. Deterministic replay systems [4, 9] make this pos-
sible by recording traces that capture non-deterministic inputs
or events and then, much like SMCs, controlling the runtime
schedule during replay to ensure that the same events occur
in the same order. Like these “heavyweight” techniques, we
want to work with arbitrary, unmodified systems by instru-
menting relatively low in the stack. However, fine-grained
scheduling is costly to run and implement, and is overkill for
the tasks of distributed tracing and fault injection.
Lightweight approaches to observing distributed executions
based on call graph tracing [3, 5, 21] have gained a great deal
of popularity in recent years, and a number of businesses are
devoted to the collection and analysis of call graph traces [1,2].
These observability infrastructures, based on Google’s Dap-
per [22] require modifications to application code in order
to propagate trace annotations (unique identifiers and other
adornments) that are attached to incoming service requests to
downstream service calls. This boilerplate, while relatively
straightforward to write, imposes a significant burden on the
application programmer and must be repeated for each ap-
plication. While we wish to provide value without requiring
work on the part of the application programmer, we would
nevertheless like to be able to reconstruct this application-
level signal from instrumentation lower in the stack.
The distributed resiliency community has long advocated
combining testing methodologies with fault injection [8, 11,
13] to increase confidence that ostensibly fault-tolerant pro-
grams operate correctly under the (rare in practice) fault
events that they were designed to mitigate. Although as dis-
cussed fault injection infrastructures are often used in concert
with tracing, they have tended to develop as separate concerns.
A stated goal of Box of Pain is to coevolve these concerns.
The data management community has used data lin-
eage [10, 15, 16, 19, 23] to explain query answers in much
the same way that the resilience community uses call graph
tracing to explain distributed executions. Lineage-driven fault
injection [5, 6], a bug-finding technique that we will discuss
further in Section 6, directly uses explanations of system out-
comes (formal data lineage or execution traces) to automate
fault injection experiments. Box of Pain was designed to inte-
grate tightly with such a bug finder, providing it with traces
as performing the fault injection experiments that it suggests.
3 A Partial Argument of a Partial Order
When tracing a distributed system, we often have two op-
tions: build tracing infrastructure into the application during
initial development, which requires difficult forethought, or
build it in afterwards, which requires a significant engineer-
ing effort that is often avoided unless necessary. Instead, if
we could trace a system at a level that provides sufficient
signal to reconstruct communication we could circumvent
the complexity of kernel-level tracing and the overhead of
application-level instrumentation. We propose tracing at the
system-call level, as this is transparent to the application, can
run on an unmodified system, allows easy experimentation
by simulating a system on one machine, and can still derive
sufficient signal to be useful for fault injection and collection
of rich system traces, as we see in this section.
One significant consequence of tracing system calls is that
the tracer will see a schedule of events with little ordering
among them. While each observed event on a per-thread basis
is ordered with respect to other events in that thread, there are
no immediate constraints on event ordering between threads.
Although the tracer sees a sequentially consistent execution
consistent with the true partial order of events, it cannot deter-
mine a richer partial order beyond this independent collection
of total orders from witnessing schedules alone.
To understand the communication structure of a program
as well as to inject faults, however, more than just this weak
schedule is needed. Fortunately, since we know the seman-
tics of the system calls, we can use their meaning to glean
more information from them than we could if we strictly ob-
served them in a particular schedule. For example, a given
(successful) call to accept cannot return until a paired call to
connect is made, or a (successful) call to read on a socket
cannot return until a causally-paired call to write is made.
The additional ordering available to us from observing
socket system calls and tracking connection and data transfer
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is exactly the communication pattern between the threads in
the system. We can use that communication pattern to derive
happens-before, which characterizes the constraints between
events of different threads, thus enabling fine-grained, tar-
geted fault injection that can specify “when” in a distributed
execution to inject faults based on the communication pattern
rather than wall-clock time. Furthermore, this pattern can be
derived during execution (as opposed to reconstructed after
completion), a requirement of a fault-injection infrastructure
that injects targeted faults based on moments within a trace.
The mechanism for this is described in Section 4.2.
Of course, a distributed execution might be different each
time it runs, as there is inherent non-determinism in message
delivery and thread scheduling. While the theoretical behavior
of a system is characterized by a collection of all possible
partial orders of events, for the purposes of fault injection
it might be sufficient to collect only a limited number of
such schedules, especially if some schedules are more likely
than others. The intuition behind schedules having different
probabilities is straight-forward: the most significant source of
non-determinism in a distributed system is the real-time order
of events between threads. However, if we recognize that we
will observe the events in some sequentially consistent order,
and we know that the events per-thread are totally ordered,
then for the purposes of comparing two schedules we can
ignore the actual order we observe the events in as long as
both schedules are consistent with the same partial order.
Thus, we are left with collecting schedules of distributed
systems that are truly different in their communication pat-
terns and behavior. This dramatically reduces the space of
executions, down from exponential in the number of events
and number of threads to the number of valid communication
patterns given a single input (which, depending on the sys-
tem, might still be large). We hypothesize (and provide initial
evidence) that most of the time, given a consistent input, a
distributed system will often produce similar partial orders,
thus allowing us to construct a representation of the system’s
behavior with a small set of runs and use that to inject faults.
If this is true, we open up a wealth of possibilities, because
we can then trace a distributed system and inject faults repeat-
edly, witnessing “good” and “bad” executions, and adjusting
our fault injection over time on a real system with no manual
instrumentation. This is the goal of Box of Pain—to use the
application-level signal we derive in a generic, low-overhead
way to inform the decisions of bug-finding frameworks and
thus fully automate tracing, fault-injection, and bug-finding.
4 Box of Pain
Box of Pain has three components: a tracer, a tracker, and an
injector. These components all operate together, watching a
distributed execution unfold. When run in a loop, Box of Pain
will determine if the execution has been seen before, allowing
it to build a collection of traces that together characterize
the relevant behaviors of the system. Optionally, Box of Pain
can be run with a failure specification that indicates precisely
which events to interrupt or modify as part of fault injection
(which we discuss in Section 4.3).
4.1 Tracing
Box of Pain operates primarily through the use of ptrace,
a system call that allows a process to perform introspection
on another process [18]. Whenever a traced thread (tracee)
issues a system call, the tracee is stopped and Box of Pain
wakes up. This occurs both for system-call entry and exit,
each referred to as an event, and Box of Pain handles each
event in full before signaling the thread to resume. Each event
that Box of Pain handles is appended to a per-thread “event
log”, and is thus in the order that they occur for that thread.
An entry-to-syscall event is indicated like read↓, and a return-
from-syscall event is indicated like read↑.
The ultimate goal of tracing is to construct a partial or-
der of events out of the schedule that Box of Pain observes.
Given just a per-thread event log, we have a partial order (a
collection of total orders, one for each thread), but this par-
tial order contains no constraints on events among threads.
Since the communication pattern between two threads and
the contraints on ordering are equivalent in our model, we
can leverage the information available in a TCP connection to
provide additional edges in the partial order for a given run.
When a socket is created, it is tracked in a per-process
lookup table (in a way that keeps track of changing file de-
scriptors). During a bind↓ event, Box of Pain reads the pro-
cess’s memory to determine the address and port that the
socket is being bound to. After the subsequent accept↑ event,
a new socket is tracked (consistent with the semantics of
accept). Since it is also tracing the connect-ing thread, it
will see the resultant connect↓ and connect↑ events, the
first of which provides enough information for Box of Pain
to decide which socket it is connecting to, but not necessarily
which socket returned by accept the connect-ing thread is
actually associated with.
To get this information, Box of Pain issues system-calls
on behalf of the tracees while handling the connect↑ and
accept↑ events. It does this by overwriting the registers of
the tracee to point to a location known to contain a syscall
instruction (determined during the first event handled per-
process), and setting the registers as required for the requested
system call. In this case, the system calls are getsockname
and getpeername, which provide sufficient information to
determine the end-points of the TCP stream. The resulting
partial order is shown in Figure 1.
For data transfer, we can use the tracked sockets to watch
as TCP traffic is communicated between end-points. When
handling a write↑, Box of Pain tracks the sequence number
of the stream and records to which system call a particu-
lar range of data belongs. When handling a read↑, Box of
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bind↑ accept↓ accept↑
connect↑connect↓
Figure 1: The happens-before relationship of accept and
connect system calls that Box of Pain derives. The colors
indicate different threads. The connect↑ cannot occur before
accept↓ occurs, because it would result in an error otherwise.
Pain looks through the recorded write system calls to decide
which writes contributed to the data returned by the read,
thus deriving an order based on the commuication pattern of
data transfer. Note that one read can get data from multiple
writes and one write can contribute to multiple reads, or it
can be a one-to-one relationship.
While many of these system calls have variants (send in-
stead of write, or accept4 instead of accept), the variants
are similar enough that they need little additional processing.
One exception is the calls sendto and recvfrom, however
these calls are infrequently used for TCP communication.
Finally, while Box of Pain traces a distributed system as a
set of threads in processes on a single node, we see it as merely
an engineering effort to extend the tracing infrastructure to
multiple nodes. A single tracer process can run on each node,
forwarding event information to a single, unified tracker node
that processes schedules and computes partial orders.
4.2 Tracking
The tracing infrastructure builds a trace of a distributed sys-
tem that consists of a per-thread event log, where each event
can have multiple parents (as derived by the communication
pattern). The trace can be serialized and viewed as a PDF,
showing the communication pattern. However, executions
may differ between runs, and if we want to be able to get an
idea of the “true” communication pattern between nodes in a
system, we’ll need to observe many of the possible schedules.
Box of Pain faciliates this by allowing previously collected
traces to be reloaded into memory before tracing a new run.
During execution, Box of Pain tries to track each loaded run
by comparing the event that just occurred in the new trace to
the “next” event in each loaded run. “Next” here means, “for
this thread, what was the next witnessed event”. For example,
if thread T records events e followed by e′, then a run is said
to be “followed” if thread T is witnessed executing those
events in the same order, even if another thread executes some
other event in between e and e′. When a particular run cannot
be followed, Box of Pain stops tracking it. If all loaded runs
are not followed, Box of Pain finishes tracing the execution
and serializes the trace as before. If instead, at the end of the
execution, a run is followed, Box of Pain does not serializing
the current trace since it is equivalent to the followed run.
4.3 Fault Injection
When running Box of Pain on a distributed system, we can
provide a fault specification that describes which events to
perturb via fault injection. Since we are considering the space
of faults to include only delay (possibly infinite) and explicit
errors, Box of Pain allows the simulation of both. The tracing
infrastructure that Box of Pain provides, and the correspond-
ing derivation of a partial order that reflects the communi-
cation structure of the system, faults in Box of Pain can be
thought of in terms of specifying a particular event, which
allows bug-finding software to consider faults in terms of
“after thread T does x and thread T ′ does y”, which improves
how targeted faults can be.
Delay is simulated by simply “pausing” a process by stop-
ping and resuming it after an amount of time (or delaying it
indefinitely). This kind of fault is the simplest to inject, as all
that is required for the fault specification is a particular event
identification. If a followed run contains such a specification,
Box of Pain will pause the process when it observes it trying
to execute that event.
Explicit error manifests more directly as Box of Pain chang-
ing the return value (or parameters) during a system call. For
example, interrupting a connection between process A and B
is done by changing the socket argument to connect to −1,
thus ensuring that the connection fails, while changing the re-
turn value to a specified error code (such as -ECONNREFUSED).
We can map “real” events into our simulation space via a
combination of manifesting explicit errors, pausing processes,
or silently dropping communications. A lengthy garbage-
collection pause can be emulated by pausing a process for
some time, while a machine crash can be emulated by either
stopping a process indefinitely, restarting the process, or drop-
ping all messages after a point in the partial order. Network
partitions are similar; we can observe the destinations of mes-
sages and drop them (either silently or via an error) if we
simulate them crossing a network partition. Later, healing the
network partition can manifest as removing those fault rules.
5 Preliminary Experiments
To provide an initial look at how many unique runs are gen-
erated by some small distributed systems, we ran the Redis
key/value store [20] under Box of Pain, and counted how
many unique runs were generated varying different parame-
ters: number of commands performed, and number of clients.
We then re-ran our two-client scenario, but simulated network
congestion by randomly forcing writes to act as if there were
full TCP buffers, randomly causing writes to only actually
write half or less than the system call originally would have.
This was done by changing the count parameter of the write
system call, reducing it to a lower value than its original value.
Figures 2 and 3 show the distribution of runs for execu-
tions by varying the parameters as described. We ran Box of
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Figure 2: Distribution of runs for one client (1cl), two clients
(2cl), and many commands (2cl-mc).
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Figure 3: Distribution of runs for two clients with full-TCP-
buffer simulation (2cl-wt) and four clients (4cl). While the
distribution is wider than Figure 2, it follows a similar shape.
Pain for two thousand iterations on each configuration, and
the graphs show the runs that make up 99% of the resulting
schedules. Each client executed a simple GET request for
all experiments except the experiment where we increased
the number of commands executed by each client (2cl-mc),
in which case each client executed four GET and SET com-
mands. In all cases, the distribution rapidly drops after a high
initial value, indicating that the majority of runs manifests as
one of a few schedules, and, while there is a long tail, we can
understand much of the system behavior without needing an
intractable number of schedules. Interestingly, increasing the
number of commands issued by each client did not dramati-
cally impact the width of the distribution, indicating that bugs
arising from complex series of interactions would be easier to
find. While the results in Figure 3 have longer tails, both of
these have the same shape and 99% of runs fall within approx-
imately 300 already known schedules after 2000 iterations
(which took well under an hour to generate).
6 The Future for Box of Pain
As excited as we are to introduce Box of Pain and to argue its
potential, we must admit that we have barely begun using it.
In this section we describe what comes next, from first steps
to a (we believe) far-reaching vision.
Box of Pain combines two concerns—tracing and fault
injection—that are typically considered separate. Before tack-
ling our larger ambitions, we plan to demonstrate its efficacy
for both independent tasks. It remains to be shown that it is
possible to extrapolate from our low-level traces something
akin to the application-level signal provided by call graph
tracing. Tracing a large-scale microservice-based application
with Box of Pain and showing that the call graphs (e.g., ob-
tained using Zipkin) could be inferred from our traces would
provide evidence that technologies like Box of Pain could
obviate the need for painstaking application-level instrumen-
tation in some cases. Similarly, we will compare Box of Pain
with the state-of-the-art in distributed fault injection. While
most of these approaches focus on triggering [8] or simu-
lating [7] fault events such as machine crashes, I/O errors,
memory pressure and corruption, system load, and so on, our
approach focuses instead on simulating the observable effects
of such faults from the perspective of other processes with
which they communicate. We expect that this much smaller
fault surface will be sufficient to uncover bugs in fault toler-
ance logic and much more efficient at doing so.
From the beginning our intention has been to use Box of
Pain in a tight loop with a trace-driven bug finder such as
LDFI. To date, LDFI has shown promise in verifying proto-
cols [6] as well in finding bugs in large-scale, microservice-
based applications [5]. In the former, programs must be speci-
fied in a custom relational logic language (similar to solvers
such as Alloy [14]), limiting applicability to real-world sys-
tems. In the latter, the systems must already be instrumented
to support call graph tracing and fine-grained fault injection.
By addressing both concerns at the system level, Box of Pain
promises to open up the LDFI approach to arbitrary, unin-
strumented systems, including distributed data managment
systems, configuration services, and messages queues.
7 Conclusion
In our field there are a great many things that are possible in
theory but impractical in practice—so much so that the idea
is a cliche. However, it is a rare day on which we learn that
something which is not possible in theory is not merely possi-
ble, but practical in practice. Box of Pain’s design for tracing
and tracking is predicated on the idea that fault injection nat-
urally fits with tracing; after all, if you want targeted fault
injection, what better place to do it than in the tracer itself?
The coevolution of these technologies will open a wealth of
possibilities that we can make use of to further close the gap
between the bugs we can easily find and the bugs we could
find if only we had sufficient tracing, a bug-finder, and infras-
tructure support—all without the need for tracing forethought
or huge engineering efforts. We have initial evidence that not
only is it possible to trace a distributed system at the system
call level and recover happens-before such that we can decide
and target faults to inject, but we can do this without the non-
determinism becoming intractible. We are excited to keep
exploring this work, and evaluating more complex systems,
looking for bugs, and further evaluating our hypothesis.
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